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Abstract
We study optimal wage schemes for teams, under the presence of budget constraints, in
a model in which agents' eort decisions are mapped into the probability of the team's
success. We show that (rst-best) eciency can only be attained with complex contracts
that are vulnerable to ex post manipulations and o-equilibrium path violations of the
budget constraints. Within the domain of simple (and budget-balanced) contracts, an
interesting scheme, which treats equal members of the team unequally, emerges as optimal.
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The design of wage schemes is central to almost any debate on the optimal functioning of
organizations. In this paper, we explore that issue in a basic and common model of team
production in which agents' eort decisions are mapped into the probability of the team's
success. Our aim is to scrutinize the eect of budget constraints in such context.
We build on a model of team production developed by Winter (2004). More precisely,
imagine a project that has to be managed by a team of (risk-neutral) agents. Each agent
decides simultaneously (i.e., without observing other agents' decisions) whether to exert eort
or not in order to perform their tasks. Exerting eort is a costly action and the higher the
skill, the lower the cost. The overall project succeeds with a probability which is an increasing
function (known as a technology) of the number of agents exerting eort. The success of the
project yields proceeds for the (risk-neutral) principal, who aims to maximize expected benets.
The principal, who knows each agent's skill and observes each agent's eort, is committed to
limited liability while designing wage schemes. She also faces a budget constraint: total payment
cannot exceed the proceeds from the project.
We start showing that the rst best, i.e., the optimal (expected) benet for the principal,
subject only to individual rationality of the agents, is easily achievable. To do so, the principal
only needs to oer a wage scheme guaranteeing each deserving agent (within the optimal subset
of the team) the cost of exerting eort. Such a scheme, however, is not contingent on the success
of the project and, therefore, may not satisfy the budget constraint.
We then move to explore schemes that are contingent on the success of the project. Among
them, we focus rst on those that are simple and base payments only on own eort choice. We
show that, for those schemes, the rst best is not achievable. More precisely, we show that the
optimal simple contingent (budget-balanced) wage scheme typically falls short of the rst-best
outcome. It turns out that such a scheme involves an endogenous hierarchy within the team.
One agent is induced to exert eort assuming no other peer is doing so. Another agent is
paid enough to make her exert eort when one other agent does so as well, etc. A consequent
feature is that equal agents are treated unequally. That is, two deserving agents with the same
qualication will end up receiving dierent wages (depending on the position they occupy in
the endogenous hierarchy).
We also show that, if we enrich the analysis to complex contingent schemes that base pay-








 suer from two shortcomings. On the one hand, they are subject to ex post manipulations, by
which we mean that the principal might benet from reporting a false eort decision of an
agent (or group of agents) to the other members of the team. On the other hand, they do not
necessarily obey the o-equilibrium path budget constraints.
The closest reference to our contribution is Winter (2004). He analyzes a very similar
model of team production in which agents' (simultaneous) eort decisions are also mapped into
the probability of the team's success. Two crucial dierences, however, exist with respect to
our model. First, eort choices are not observable, which makes the moral-hazard problem
the priority of the analysis. Second, there is no utility function for the principal and it is
simply assumed that the principal's aim is to make all agents exert eort, whereas our focus
is to determine the optimal subset of agents (within the team) exerting eort, as well as their
wages. Winter's main result is that, in order to make all agents exert eort, the principal
must discriminate among identical agents, provided technology functions exhibit increasing
returns to scale. We too get a similar result. More precisely, we show that, with simple
contingent contracts (the closest specication to Winter's setting), the optimal scheme (i.e., the
one maximizing the principal's expected utility) also amounts to discriminate among identical
agents. As we shall show later, this feature occurs in our model without imposing additional
conditions whatsoever on the technology functions. Nevertheless, our result cannot be seen as
a generalization of Winter's result, as there is not moral hazard in our model.
Our work also relates to the extensive literature on optimal compensation schemes in part-
nerships with unobservable eort and subject to budget balance. In a seminal contribution of
this literature, Holmstrom (1982) introduces a model in which a group of agents produce an
output that depends deterministically on the unobservable actions taken by the agents. Given
a realized output, a sharing rule divides the output among the agents. Holmstrom's main re-
sult says that, if budget balance is required, the ecient output cannot be sustained in a Nash
equilibrium. However, he also shows that if the budget balancing constraint is relaxed, e-
ciency can be sustained through the imposition of group penalties. In the wake of Holmstrom
(1982), there have been a number of attempts to challenge the conclusion that partnerships are
inecient forms of organization because the partners cannot solve their moral hazard problem.
For instance, Rasmusen (1987) shows that ecient production is implementable, when agents
are risk averse, by the use of random punishments. Legros and Matsushima (1991) provide
necessary and sucient conditions for sustaining eciency by balanced transfer rules, when








 that budget balanced sharing rules can implement nearly ecient outcomes in a wide variety
of games through the use of mixed strategies. However, in approximating the ecient output
arbitrarily closely, the punishments used to enforce the equilibrium become arbitrarily large.
Thus, this equilibrium does not exhibit limited liability as the equilibrium expected output
approaches the ecient output. Miller (1997) departs from Holmstrom's original model upon
assuming that one (and only one) agent observes the actions taken by a subset of the other
agents and issues a report conditional on that observation. Miller's main result says that when-
ever the observing agent can see at least one other agent's action, eciency, limited liability,
and budget balance can be achieved simultaneously. A related approach is taken by Ma (1988),
who shows that when the output is stochastic and agents' actions are mutually observable (al-
though unobservable to the principal), there exists a mechanism that implements the ecient
output as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.
A partnership is characterized by joint ownership and by sharing of the nal output among
the partners. Thus, the issue is to design sharing rules that, ideally, are budget balanced and
induce agents achieve the ecient output. In our model, however, the nal output goes for
the principal, who selects the compensation scheme for the members of the team. Ideally,
such a scheme should also induce agents achieve the ecient (rst-best) output. The budget
constraint forces the principal to make payments contingent on the nal output. In contrast
to the above-mentioned literature, our model assumes that agents' eort is perfectly observed
by the principal (or, alternatively, the monitoring cost is negligible) whereas agents do not
observe their peers' actions. Thus, there is neither moral hazard nor adverse selection in our
model, which allows us to place the eect of budget constraints under further scrutiny. As
mentioned above, we obtain that (rst-best) eciency, limited liability, and budget balance
can be achieved simultaneously in our model. Nevertheless, the three goals combined are only
obtained through (complex contingent) contracts that are vulnerable to ex post manipulations
and o-equilibrium path violations of the budget constraint.
Our results crucially rely on two assumptions: equilibrium uniqueness and simultaneous
actions. The former amounts to consider only wage schemes whose resulting games have a
unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.1 The latter amounts to assume that members of
the team take their eort decisions simultaneously. As we shall show later, it turns out that
dispensing with any of the two assumptions, i.e., allowing for schemes generating multiple
1Regarded as a standard requirement in the implementation literature, uniqueness of equilibrium has ob-








 equilibria, or considering sequential eort decisions, permits to achieve (rst-best) eciency,
limited liability, and budget balance (on and o the equilibrium path) simultaneously, through
simple contracts in which payments only depend on own eort choice and the realized output,
and that are immune to ex post manipulations.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and basic
denitions. Section 3 contains the main results of the paper. Section 4 explores two extensions
of the benchmark model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There is a project involving n activities performed by n agents of a team, which we denote
as N = f1;:::;ng. Each agent i 2 N decides simultaneously whether to exert eort (invest)
or not towards the performance of her activity. We denote by i 2 f0;1g the eort decision
of agent i, where i = 1 (0) if agent i does (not) exert eort. The cost of exerting eort of
agent i is ci  0. This parameter is to be interpreted as a sign of the agent's skill (i.e., the
lower the cost of exerting eort, the higher the skill). We assume, without loss of generality,
that c1  c2    cn. An agent will invest if and only if her expected benets (i.e., her
expected wage minus her cost) are non-negative. The project's technology is a non-decreasing
function p : f0;1;:::;ng ! [0;1] specifying the probability that the project succeeds, for any
given number of agents exerting eort.3 In doing so, we are implicitly assuming that agents'
eorts are equally valuable for the success of the project.
A principal observes agents' skills and eort decisions, as well as the outcome of the project,
and designs the wage scheme for the team with the aim of maximizing her benets. We denote
by  = 1 (0) the event in which the project is (not) successful.4 The value of  will be considered
as a public signal, observed not only by the principal, but also by each agent. On the other
hand, agents will neither observe their peers' eort decisions nor be able to infer them ex post.
Let  > 0 denote the proceeds for the principal if the project is successful and assume
that an unsuccessful project yields 0. Agents are subject to limited liability, which means that
2This is reminiscent of the approach taken by Strausz (1999) who shows that sequentiality can mitigate the
ineciency of partnerships. It is also reminiscent of Winter (2006) who studies sequential optimal incentive
schemes in organizations where agents perform their tasks sequentially and obtains further insights to some of
the features in Winter (2004).
3For ease of exposition, we assume that p(1) > 0.
4With this notation, we have that, for each k 2 f0;1;:::;ng, p(k) = Pr( = 1j
P








 the principal cannot impose negative wages on them.5 The principal is subject to a budget
constraint, which means that the (overall) oered wages could not exceed the revenues of the
team.
Formally, for each i 2 N, let !i(i;; i) denote agent i's wage. As we can infer from here,
i's wage might not only depend on i's eort decision, and the success (or failure) of the project,
but also on her peers' eort decisions. The resulting (expected) benets for each agent are then
constructed as follows:















Note that, as eort decisions are observed by the principal, it is natural to assume that only
deserving agents are rewarded. Formally,
(A1) Agent Limited Liability: !i(0;; i) = 0; for all (; i) 2 f0;1gn:
If the budget constraint forces the principal to commit to an overall cost of the wage scheme
below the proceeds obtained from the project, it is also natural to assume that no agent earns
a positive wage if the project is unsuccessful. Formally,
(A2) Team Limited Liability: !i(i;0; i) = 0; for all (i; i) 2 f0;1gn:
Thus, (expected) benets amount to











The issue for the principal is, ultimately, to design an optimal wage scheme ! = f!i(;;)gi2N,
i.e., a scheme maximizing her benets. Now, any wage scheme announced by the principal de-
nes a game. In such a game, the members of the team decide whether to exert eort or not, and
their benets, as described above, will typically depend not only on their individual decisions,
and the success (or failure) of the project, but also on their peers' decisions explicitly. Formally,
let ! = f!i(;;)gi2N be a given wage scheme and denote by G! = fN;f0;1g
n ;figi2Ng the
resulting game.
We shall restrict our attention to those schemes whose resulting games have a unique (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium. In doing so, we get rid of the strategic uncertainty, univocally
5Limited liability of the agents may arise from workers' having the freedom to quit or from institutional
constraints such as laws banning rms' exacting payments from workers. In any case, dropping this assumption








 determining the outcome of the game and, hence, the (expected) utility for the principal derived
from such a scheme.6
(A3) Equilibrium Uniqueness: G! has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Formally, let ! = (!
1; ;!
n) denote the (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of G!. Let K!
denote the set of agents exerting eort in such an equilibrium, i.e., K! = fi 2 N : !
i = 1g,
and k! its cardinality, i.e., k! =
P
i2N !
i . We then complement assumption (A2) to reect the






 denote the set of wage schemes satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A4). Then, provided

















If ! denotes a solution to the above program, then ! is referred to as an optimal scheme,
K! as the corresponding optimal team, and k! as the optimal size of the team. In what follows,
and for ease of exposition, we shall assume that any optimal scheme ! satises !
i(i;; i) = 0
for all i = 2 K!. As we shall see later, the optimal teams will always comprise the most skilled
agents. Formally, it will always be the case that K! = f1;:::;k!g.
We now introduce some schemes that will play an important role in our analysis. For
ease of exposition, we start considering schemes that are not contingent on the success of the
project and, hence, might not obey (A4). Formally, let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Then, the canonical








ici if i 2 f1;:::;kg,
0 otherwise.
The schemes in 
 will obviously be contingent on the success of the project. We single
out rst those that base payments only on own eort choice and the outcome of the project,
and not on peers' eort choices. Formally, !i(i;; i) = !i(i;;0
 i) for all i 2 N and
 i;0
 i 2 f0;1gn 1 for all i 2 N. We shall refer to them as simple contingent wage schemes








 and denote their set as 
s  
. An instance is the following. Let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Then, the










p(k) if i 2 f1;:::;kg,
0 otherwise.
For reasons that will become clear later in the text, it might be necessary to provide the fol-
lowing alternative asymmetric scheme to the previous one. Formally, let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Then,











p(i) if i 2 f1;:::;kg,
0 otherwise.
The set 
 will also comprise schemes for which payments are based on the whole eort
prole. We shall refer to them as complex contingent wage schemes. An instance would be the
following. Let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Then, the canonical k complex (contingent) wage scheme












j2N j) if i 2 f1;:::;kg,
0 otherwise.
3 The main results
3.1 The rst best
In order to frame our study, we start exploring the reference case in which (A4) is not imposed.
Let 
 denote the set of wage schemes satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A3). The following result
summarizes our ndings in this case.
Proposition 1 Let e k denote the solution to the program
max
k=0;1;:::;n





e knc is an optimal scheme among those in 
.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that K!
e knc = f1;:::;e kg and, thus, (!
e knc) = p(e k)    
Pe k
i=1 ci. Assume, by contradiction, that there is a scheme ! 2 
 such that (!) > (!
e knc).
Then, as the agents in K! should be granted (in expected terms) at least their costs of exerting
eort, we have
(!)  p(k











 Now, by denition of e k,
p(k




!)    
k! X
i=1






The previous proposition tells us that if the principal faces no budget constraint, then she
cannot do better than by rewarding agents within the optimal team with their cost of exerting
eort. We will refer to (!
e knc) = p(e k)    
Pe k
i=1 ci as the rst-best outcome for the principal,
and to a scheme guaranteeing such outcome as a scheme achieving rst-best eciency or, simply,
a rst-best scheme.
It is worth mentioning that !
e knc induces a unique Nash equilibrium thanks to our tie-
breaking rule by which agents exert eort when they are indierent between doing so and
shirking. An alternative option to imposing this tie-breaking rule would have been to consider
the following formal denition of an optimal mechanism: ! is an optimal mechanism if (1)
there exists no other mechanism yielding more expected benets for the principal and (2) for
any " > 0, f!+"gi2K! is an investment-inducing mechanism, i.e., the unique Nash equilibrium
of the corresponding game is the prole in which all agents in K! exert eort. This innocent
technical caveat is needed because rewards take continuous values.7
In what follows, we consider schemes that reect the existence of budget constraints upon
making wages contingent on the success of the project, i.e., we move from 
 to 
. Our aim
is to explore whether rst-best schemes might exist among them. We start focusing on what
we called simple contingent schemes (
s) for which the wage of an agent is only determined by
the eort decision of such agent, and the outcome of the team (to be interpreted as a public
signal), but not (explicitly) by her peers' eort decisions. We then move to the general case in
which contingent schemes might explicitly include peers' eort decisions.
3.2 The simple contingent case
Our main result within this section is the following.













 ksa is the optimal scheme among those in 
s.








 Proof. Let us rst consider a simple contingent wage scheme for which the unique Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding game is the prole in which all agents exert eort. Formally,
let ! = (!1(1;);!2(2;);:::;!n(n;)) 2 




Then, in particular, (1;2;:::;n) = (0;0;:::;0) is not a Nash equilibrium for that game,
which implies that there exists, at least, an agent i1 2 N wanting to deviate by investing. In





Let us consider now the prole (1;2;:::;n) in which i1 = 1 and i = 0 otherwise.10 As this
prole cannot be an equilibrium either, it follows that there exists an agent i2 2 Nnfi1g wanting






This argument can be subsequently repeated for the remaining proles to show, in the end,



































is the optimal scheme among those in 
s to guarantee that all agents in N exert eort (together
with the schemes obtained by permuting indices corresponding to agents with a same cost, which
would also generate the same overall wage).
8Note that if i1 deviates there would only be one agent exerting eort, which would make p(1) the probability
of success and therefore the probability for agent i1 of getting a positive wage !i1(1;1).
9Note that this condition guarantees that exerting eort is a dominant strategy for agent i1.
10Note that (4) not only guarantees that the prole in which no agent exerts eort is not a Nash equilibrium,
but also that no prole in which only one agent (dierent from i1) exerts eort constitutes a Nash equilibrium
either.
11Note that if i2 deviates there would be only two agents exerting eort, which would make p(2) the probability








 Thus, it follows that the optimal scheme among those in 
s to guarantee that agents in a





for all i 2 K, where (i) denotes the rank of i in K, and !i(1;1) = 0 for all i = 2 K. Therefore,
among the sets with the same cardinality of K, the optimal one for the principal would be











A straightforward consequence from the statement of the above theorem is the following:
Corollary 1 In general, no simple contingent (budget-balanced) wage scheme is rst best.
Proof. It suces to compare the objective functions from the statements of Proposition 1 and


























from where the statement follows.12
It also follows from Theorem 1 that the optimal way of managing a team by a budget-
balanced principal, restricted to simple contingent schemes, would be designing a cascade that
generate a sort of endogenous hierarchy within the team. More precisely, one agent is induced
to exert eort assuming no other peer is doing so. Another agent is paid enough to make her
exert eort when one other agent does so as well, etc. A consequent feature of such a scheme is
that it treats equal agents unequally. That is, two deserving agents with the same qualication
12One might argue that the scheme !
 ksa is reminiscent of an incentive compatible contract with hidden action:
as the budget constraint prevents the principal from oering a compensation to the agent if the team is not
successful, the principal is forced to oer a higher compensation in case of success of the project, so that in








 will end up receiving dierent wages (actually depending on the position they occupy in the
endogenous hierarchy just described). In other words, the optimal (budget-balanced) simple
contingent wage scheme is extremely inegalitarian, as it violates the most fundamental notion
of impartiality.
Corollary 2 The optimal simple contingent (budget-balanced) wage scheme violates equal treat-
ment of equals.
The previous feature is also obtained by Winter (2004) who shows that, when eort is
not observable, and the principal's aim is to induce all agents exert eort, then the optimal
way to do so would be upon discriminating among agents, even when they are identical and
act simultaneously. Alternative explanations as to why organizations might treat equal agents
unequally have also been recently considered (e.g., Yildrim, 2007; Dhillon and Herzog-Stein,
2009). The intuition behind the role of discrimination in the above scheme is also related to
some common strategies in trade contracts (e.g., Cabral et al., 1999; Segal, 2003).
3.3 The complex contingent case
Simple contingent wage schemes might partially be justied on the grounds that agents neither
observe their peers' eort decisions nor are able to infer them ex post, and therefore would not
nd credible contingent contracts which depend on additional aspects to their individual eort
choices and the outcome of the project (which is indeed observed by all agents and thus could
be interpreted as a public signal). Nevertheless, one might think of alternative contexts of team
production in which more exibility is allowed while designing wage schemes, and additional
information (e.g., private signals that only the principal observes) might also be considered.
If so, complex contingent wage schemes would be meaningful. It turns out that, contrary to
what happened with simple contingent schemes, complex contingent schemes might be rst-best
schemes.
Proposition 2 The scheme !
e kcc is a rst-best (contingent) scheme.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that K!
e kcc = f1;:::;e kg. Then, the statement simply


















 coincides with the program of Proposition 1. Thus, (!
e kcc) = (!
e knc), as desired.
One would be tempted to infer from the above proposition that the eect of budget con-
straints is indeed negligible for a principal with enough exibility to design contingent schemes
(in particular, to consider the scheme !
e kcc). The rest of the section conveys two caveats to such
a statement.
3.3.1 Ex post manipulations
As mentioned above, the corresponding optimal team for the scheme !
e kcc is K!
e kcc = f1;:::;e kg.
Let us assume that an agent i 2 K!
e kcc deviates from the equilibrium and ends up shirking.
Assume, too, that the project ends up being successful. Then, the scheme !
e kcc would grant the





p(e k   1)
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then the principal would benet from hiding the shirking decision of i to the other members of
the optimal team. In other words, there would be an incentive to manipulate the outcome ex
post.13
In general, we say that a wage scheme ! is subject to (ex post) manipulation if, for
some technologies, the principal could benet from hiding the shirking of an agent (or group

















j = 1 if j 2 K! n K and 0 otherwise.
13This is, by no means, a specic case. Think, for instance, of the natural case in which p(k) = n k for some
 2 (0;1) (e.g., Winter, 2004; 2006) and c1 = cn. It turns out that if  < 1=e then !








 The next result shows that !
e kcc is, by no means, unique in being subject to ex post manip-
ulation.14
Theorem 2 All rst-best contingent wage schemes are subject to ex post manipulation.
Proof. Let ! be a rst-best contingent scheme. It is straightforward to show that the optimal
team for this scheme must coincide with the optimal team for the non-contingent scheme !
e knc.
Formally, K! = f1;:::;e kg and ! = (
e k z }| {







for all i 2 K!.15
Similarly, the prole in which all agents shirk is not an equilibrium of the game G!. Thus,














Then, it is straightforward to show that






This shows that ! is subject to ex post manipulations, as expected.
A caveat to Theorem 2 is worth mentioning. The theorem is indeed showing that, for
some technologies, the rst-best (constrained) wage schemes are subject to ex post manipula-
tions. Equally true is that for other technologies, the rst-best (constrained) wage schemes are
immune from that feature. This suggests a natural procedure to rank ecient (and budget-
balanced) schemes by comparing the set of technologies for which they are immune to ex post
manipulations.
To conclude with this section, it is worth commenting about the contractibility assumptions
behind the concept of ex post manipulation, which are somehow at odds with the standard
14On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that all simple contingent schemes are immune to ex post
manipulations.









 approach in contract theory. In contract theory, a contractible event is generally assumed to
be an event that is veriable in a court. In this view, either the agent's eort is contractible
or it is not. We, nevertheless, make a distinction between verifying in a court a low or a high
eort decision. More precisely, we assume that an agent can show evidence in a court of her
(high) eort decision, which would prevent the principal from cheating about it. On the other
hand, as agents' decisions are not mutually observable in our model, agent i could not stand
in a court to denounce a false report by the principal of agent j's decision. In other words, an
agent can only resort to a court to defend her eort decision, but not to accuse another agent
of a shirking decision. Thus, the principal cannot falsely report than an agent has chosen low
eort (shirking), but she might well report (falsely) that an agent has chosen high eort.
3.3.2 O-path budget constraint
Another caveat to rst-best (contingent) schemes comes from the fact that we can only guaran-
tee they fully obey the budget constraint on the equilibrium path. More precisely, think of the
scheme !
e kcc, which, as we know from Proposition 2, is a rst-best (contingent) scheme. Let us
assume that an agent i 2 K!
e kcc deviates from the equilibrium and ends up shirking. Assume,
too, that the project ends up being successful. Then, the scheme !






p(e k   1)
;
which might well be negative, for some technology functions p. Thus, !
e kcc does not always obey
the budget constraint o the equilibrium path. The next result shows that !
e kcc is not unique
in this respect either.16
Theorem 3 All rst-best contingent wage schemes are subject to o-path violations of the
budget constraint.
Proof. Let ! be a rst-best (contingent) scheme. As shown in the proof of Theorem 2, there





16On the other hand, it is straightforward to show that all simple contingent schemes obey the budget
constraint o the equilibrium path too. This is actually a consequence of the fact that those schemes are













If, for such a technology, all agents from the optimal team, except for i0, would deviate (from
the equilibrium path) then the principal would face the payos   
ci0
p(1) < 0. Thus, ! would
violate at least one of the o-path budget constraints, as expected.
To summarize, the purpose of this section was twofold: rst, to show that rst-best eciency
can indeed be attained with complex contingent schemes, hence challenging the lessons derived
from simple contingent schemes;17 and second, to show that there exists a toll in adopting those
rst-best contingent schemes.
4 Further insights
We explore in this section how our analysis would change by relaxing two crucial assumptions
over which our benchmark model relies.
4.1 Strategic uncertainty
As mentioned above, our benchmark model only considers wage schemes whose resulting games
have a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium (assumption A3). The reason for that was to get
rid of the strategic uncertainty that would arise with the presence of more than one equilibrium
(and, thus, more than one option to materialize agents' coordination).
An alternative (less demanding) modeling option would be to allow for wage schemes whose
resulting games have at least one (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. An interpretation for this
alternative option is that the principal is optimistic and believes that agents will coordinate
on the right equilibrium. In other words, the principal is not concerned with the strategic
uncertainty induced by the presence of multiple equilibria. Possible rationales for this feature
would be to assume that the principal is able to pick her preferred equilibrium by acting as a
mediator who coordinates the agents expectations, or that one equilibrium out of multiple can
be naturally focal (e.g., taking into consideration potential pre-play communication).
We show next that this alternative modeling option alters our results substantially, as
summarized in the following proposition.
17A similar feature has been recently shown in the context of a multitask moral hazard problem with partial








 Proposition 3 If strategic uncertainty is permitted, then there exists a simple contingent
(budget-balanced) wage scheme which is rst best, impartial, and immune to ex post manip-
ulations.
Proof. We start by noting that the rst best would not change in this new setting in which
strategic uncertainty is permitted. Consider then the simple contingent (budget-balanced)
scheme !
e kss. It is not dicult to show that (
e k z }| {
1;:::;1;0;:::;0) is an equilibrium of the game
G!
e kss.18 Thus, the principal would achieve the rst-best outcome, provided agents coordinate
in such equilibrium. It is also straightforward to show that !
e kss is impartial and immune to ex
post manipulations.
It follows from Proposition 3 that the eect of the budget constraint could be mitigated at
the cost of assuming strategic uncertainty in the design of contingent wage schemes. Never-
theless, this seemingly innocuous aspect actually constitutes a substantial cost: the alternative
equilibrium (in which all agents shirk) that would typically arise under !
e kss is risk dominant
and, thus, a more likely candidate to describe the potential coordination of the agents (e.g.,
Cabrales et al., 2010).
4.2 Hierarchical structures
Our benchmark model also assumes a at organization for the team, i.e., all agents take their
eort decisions simultaneously. This could be interpreted as assuming that communication
among agents does not exist, perhaps reecting geographical constraints. An alternative option
would be to assume a hierarchical organization in which agents instead of performing their tasks
simultaneously do so sequentially and, therefore, knowing the eort choices of their predecessors
in the hierarchy. In such a case, the natural equilibrium notion to be used, while designing
schemes, would be the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. It turns out, as it happened with the
case of strategic uncertainty, that this change also alters our results substantially, as summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If the team has a hierarchical structure, then there exists a simple contingent
(budget-balanced) wage scheme which is rst best, impartial, and immune to ex post manipula-
tions.
18Typically, the prole in which all agents shirk will also be an equilibrium of this game and hence the strategic
uncertainty. This was not the case for scheme !








 Proof. We start by noting that the rst best would not change in this new setting in which a
hierarchical (instead of at) structure is assumed for the team. Consider then, as in the proof of
Proposition 3, the simple contingent (budget-balanced) scheme !
e kss. It is not dicult to show
that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the (sequential) game G!
e kss is
(
e k z }| {
1;:::;1;0;:::;0).19 It follows from here that !
e kss is rst best, impartial and immune to ex
post manipulations.
Proposition 4 then shows that the eect of budget constraints would also be mitigated if
principals were allowed to freely design the architecture of their teams.
5 Discussion
We have studied in this article the design of optimal wage schemes, under the presence of budget
constraints, in a simple model of organization in which agents' eort decisions are mapped into
the probability of the team's success. We have shown that the rst best a principal would attain
with no budget constraint can only be recovered under complex contracts, and at the price of
vulnerability to ex post manipulations and to violations of the budget constraint o the equilib-
rium path. Such a nding crucially relies on two modeling assumptions regarding the structure
of the team and the (lack of) strategic uncertainty. More precisely, if one assumes a hierarchical
(rather than a at) organization for the team, or permits strategic uncertainty, then rst-best
eciency can be recovered with a simple contract, immune to ex post manipulations. Now,
even though sequential production has been a common practice for the traditional production
of most durable goods (e.g., Winter, 2006), it seems to be a less realistic assumption nowadays,
where hierarchies are transforming themselves from top-down structures into more horizontal
and collaborative ones (e.g., Friedman, 2007). As for permitting strategic uncertainty, which
is a natural course of action in the literature on partnerships, the problem arises with the fact
that the equilibrium in which all agents shirk would typically emerge as a coordination device
among all existing equilibria (e.g., Cabrales et al., 2010).
Our model of team production departs from the standard literature on partnerships in its
observability assumptions. In our case, and as opposed to that literature, the principal of the
team observes each agent's eort decision, which are, on the other hand, not mutually observed
by the agents themselves. In that sense, our model would t better the case of rms subject to








 fragmentation, i.e., the breakdown of technology for producing some good into discrete parts
that can be separated in space. Nowadays, and thanks to the Internet, many fragmentation
processes might involve agents who do not communicate among themselves, but only report to
a principal, who is monitoring each step of the process. In those cases, it is natural to assume
that workers within the rm do not observe the eort choices of their peers, although they
might observe the outcome of the team (the goods that are eventually produced and delivered
by the rm). That is indeed the case of our model.
We have shown that, in our context, contracts relating only to an agent's individual eort
decision and to the nal outcome of the team (the public signal) never attain rst-best eciency
(unless we change the two modeling assumptions mentioned above). On the other hand, they
are immune to ex post manipulations (and hence obey o-path budget constraints too). It turns
out that the optimal scheme under this specication involves an endogenous hierarchy, which
treats equal agents unequally and thus violates impartiality. Imposing non-discrimination as
a requirement of wage schemes (as it happens in most advanced democracies) would therefore
add to the deadweight (eciency) loss, as the optimal scheme would amount to modify the
endogenous hierarchy by equalizing (to the top) the wages of equally deserving agents. Imposing
further compensations, such as requiring a positive (albeit limited) discrimination in favor of the
disabled (something also frequent in advanced democracies; e.g., the Americans with Disabilities
Act), would increase even more the deadweight (eciency) loss. For instance, requiring that
the wage scheme be prioritarian (e.g., Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006) which would mean
in this context that no agent dominates another both in the wage obtained, as well as in the
expected benets earned.
Our analysis also provides rationale for the so-called \rich get richer" hypothesis. In a
market economy, there is no clear implication as to whether economic activities will tend to
reduce or else to widen initial wealth disparities (e.g., Durham et al., 1998). The so-called
Paradox of Power (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1991) is the observation that poorer or weaker contestants
improve their position relative to richer or stronger opponents. Nevertheless, in some social
and economic contexts the reverse occurs, i.e., initially richer and/or more powerful contestants
do exploit weaker rivals and thus the rich get richer. Our model and results take a side on the
debate between the Paradox of Power and the \rich get richer" hypothesis upon endorsing the
latter one. As we have outlined above, if ex post manipulation wants to be ruled out from the
outset, then budget constraints prevent a principal from obtaining rst-best eciency. Hence








 making rich principals richer. One might argue that the principal could buy insurance to get
around the budget constraints. A plausible way to explore this option in our model would
be to enrich the analysis to intermediate types of management strategies in which wages are
only partially contingent on the project's success. More precisely, assume that the principal
has some stock of resources, although maybe not enough to face the salaries of all workers if
the project is not successful. If so, it can be shown (e.g., L opez-Pintado and Moreno-Ternero,
2009) that the optimal scheme would guarantee each deserving agent a fraction from the stock,
as well as a bonus contingent on the project's success, and that the most talented agents would
be fully paid. This is reminiscent of some other discrimination processes in the labor market
(e.g., Milgrom and Oster, 1988).
To conclude, it is also worth mentioning that our results are based on the assumption that
agents are all risk neutral. The reason for this was simply to provide the most conservative
framework regarding the eect of a budget constraint. It is straightforward to show that if
agents were risk averse, then the deadweight (eciency) loss associated to the budget constraints
would be even higher.
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